efedorova e98258043d Add wsgi support.
Add config file
Fix interacting with consts
Change section names in manifests to correspond data_type
2013-10-14 11:07:48 +04:00

522 lines
18 KiB
Python

# vim: tabstop=4 shiftwidth=4 softtabstop=4
# Copyright 2013 Red Hat, Inc.
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain
# a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the
# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations
# under the License.
import base64
import collections
import os
import struct
import time
import requests
from oslo.config import cfg
from metadata_service.openstack.common.crypto import utils as cryptoutils
from metadata_service.openstack.common import jsonutils
from metadata_service.openstack.common import log as logging
secure_message_opts = [
cfg.BoolOpt('enabled', default=True,
help='Whether Secure Messaging (Signing) is enabled,'
' defaults to enabled'),
cfg.BoolOpt('enforced', default=False,
help='Whether Secure Messaging (Signing) is enforced,'
' defaults to not enforced'),
cfg.BoolOpt('encrypt', default=False,
help='Whether Secure Messaging (Encryption) is enabled,'
' defaults to not enabled'),
cfg.StrOpt('secret_keys_file',
help='Path to the file containing the keys, takes precedence'
' over secret_key'),
cfg.MultiStrOpt('secret_key',
help='A list of keys: (ex: name:<base64 encoded key>),'
' ignored if secret_keys_file is set'),
cfg.StrOpt('kds_endpoint',
help='KDS endpoint (ex: http://kds.example.com:35357/v3)'),
]
secure_message_group = cfg.OptGroup('secure_messages',
title='Secure Messaging options')
LOG = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class SecureMessageException(Exception):
"""Generic Exception for Secure Messages."""
msg = "An unknown Secure Message related exception occurred."
def __init__(self, msg=None):
if msg is None:
msg = self.msg
super(SecureMessageException, self).__init__(msg)
class SharedKeyNotFound(SecureMessageException):
"""No shared key was found and no other external authentication mechanism
is available.
"""
msg = "Shared Key for [%s] Not Found. (%s)"
def __init__(self, name, errmsg):
super(SharedKeyNotFound, self).__init__(self.msg % (name, errmsg))
class InvalidMetadata(SecureMessageException):
"""The metadata is invalid."""
msg = "Invalid metadata: %s"
def __init__(self, err):
super(InvalidMetadata, self).__init__(self.msg % err)
class InvalidSignature(SecureMessageException):
"""Signature validation failed."""
msg = "Failed to validate signature (source=%s, destination=%s)"
def __init__(self, src, dst):
super(InvalidSignature, self).__init__(self.msg % (src, dst))
class UnknownDestinationName(SecureMessageException):
"""The Destination name is unknown to us."""
msg = "Invalid destination name (%s)"
def __init__(self, name):
super(UnknownDestinationName, self).__init__(self.msg % name)
class InvalidEncryptedTicket(SecureMessageException):
"""The Encrypted Ticket could not be successfully handled."""
msg = "Invalid Ticket (source=%s, destination=%s)"
def __init__(self, src, dst):
super(InvalidEncryptedTicket, self).__init__(self.msg % (src, dst))
class InvalidExpiredTicket(SecureMessageException):
"""The ticket received is already expired."""
msg = "Expired ticket (source=%s, destination=%s)"
def __init__(self, src, dst):
super(InvalidExpiredTicket, self).__init__(self.msg % (src, dst))
class CommunicationError(SecureMessageException):
"""The Communication with the KDS failed."""
msg = "Communication Error (target=%s): %s"
def __init__(self, target, errmsg):
super(CommunicationError, self).__init__(self.msg % (target, errmsg))
class InvalidArgument(SecureMessageException):
"""Bad initialization argument."""
msg = "Invalid argument: %s"
def __init__(self, errmsg):
super(InvalidArgument, self).__init__(self.msg % errmsg)
Ticket = collections.namedtuple('Ticket', ['skey', 'ekey', 'esek'])
class KeyStore(object):
"""A storage class for Signing and Encryption Keys.
This class creates an object that holds Generic Keys like Signing
Keys, Encryption Keys, Encrypted SEK Tickets ...
"""
def __init__(self):
self._kvps = dict()
def _get_key_name(self, source, target, ktype):
return (source, target, ktype)
def _put(self, src, dst, ktype, expiration, data):
name = self._get_key_name(src, dst, ktype)
self._kvps[name] = (expiration, data)
def _get(self, src, dst, ktype):
name = self._get_key_name(src, dst, ktype)
if name in self._kvps:
expiration, data = self._kvps[name]
if expiration > time.time():
return data
else:
del self._kvps[name]
return None
def clear(self):
"""Wipes the store clear of all data."""
self._kvps.clear()
def put_ticket(self, source, target, skey, ekey, esek, expiration):
"""Puts a sek pair in the cache.
:param source: Client name
:param target: Target name
:param skey: The Signing Key
:param ekey: The Encription Key
:param esek: The token encrypted with the target key
:param expiration: Expiration time in seconds since Epoch
"""
keys = Ticket(skey, ekey, esek)
self._put(source, target, 'ticket', expiration, keys)
def get_ticket(self, source, target):
"""Returns a Ticket (skey, ekey, esek) namedtuple for the
source/target pair.
"""
return self._get(source, target, 'ticket')
_KEY_STORE = KeyStore()
class _KDSClient(object):
USER_AGENT = 'oslo-incubator/rpc'
def __init__(self, endpoint=None, timeout=None):
"""A KDS Client class."""
self._endpoint = endpoint
if timeout is not None:
self.timeout = float(timeout)
else:
self.timeout = None
def _do_get(self, url, request):
req_kwargs = dict()
req_kwargs['headers'] = dict()
req_kwargs['headers']['User-Agent'] = self.USER_AGENT
req_kwargs['headers']['Content-Type'] = 'application/json'
req_kwargs['data'] = jsonutils.dumps({'request': request})
if self.timeout is not None:
req_kwargs['timeout'] = self.timeout
try:
resp = requests.get(url, **req_kwargs)
except requests.ConnectionError as e:
err = "Unable to establish connection. %s" % e
raise CommunicationError(url, err)
return resp
def _get_reply(self, url, resp):
if resp.text:
try:
body = jsonutils.loads(resp.text)
reply = body['reply']
except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
msg = "Failed to decode reply: %s" % resp.text
raise CommunicationError(url, msg)
else:
msg = "No reply data was returned."
raise CommunicationError(url, msg)
return reply
def _get_ticket(self, request, url=None, redirects=10):
"""Send an HTTP request.
Wraps around 'requests' to handle redirects and common errors.
"""
if url is None:
if not self._endpoint:
raise CommunicationError(url, 'Endpoint not configured')
url = self._endpoint + '/kds/ticket'
while redirects:
resp = self._do_get(url, request)
if resp.status_code in (301, 302, 305):
# Redirected. Reissue the request to the new location.
url = resp.headers['location']
redirects -= 1
continue
elif resp.status_code != 200:
msg = "Request returned failure status: %s (%s)"
err = msg % (resp.status_code, resp.text)
raise CommunicationError(url, err)
return self._get_reply(url, resp)
raise CommunicationError(url, "Too many redirections, giving up!")
def get_ticket(self, source, target, crypto, key):
# prepare metadata
md = {'requestor': source,
'target': target,
'timestamp': time.time(),
'nonce': struct.unpack('Q', os.urandom(8))[0]}
metadata = base64.b64encode(jsonutils.dumps(md))
# sign metadata
signature = crypto.sign(key, metadata)
# HTTP request
reply = self._get_ticket({'metadata': metadata,
'signature': signature})
# verify reply
signature = crypto.sign(key, (reply['metadata'] + reply['ticket']))
if signature != reply['signature']:
raise InvalidEncryptedTicket(md['source'], md['destination'])
md = jsonutils.loads(base64.b64decode(reply['metadata']))
if ((md['source'] != source or
md['destination'] != target or
md['expiration'] < time.time())):
raise InvalidEncryptedTicket(md['source'], md['destination'])
# return ticket data
tkt = jsonutils.loads(crypto.decrypt(key, reply['ticket']))
return tkt, md['expiration']
# we need to keep a global nonce, as this value should never repeat non
# matter how many SecureMessage objects we create
_NONCE = None
def _get_nonce():
"""We keep a single counter per instance, as it is so huge we can't
possibly cycle through within 1/100 of a second anyway.
"""
global _NONCE
# Lazy initialize, for now get a random value, multiply by 2^32 and
# use it as the nonce base. The counter itself will rotate after
# 2^32 increments.
if _NONCE is None:
_NONCE = [struct.unpack('I', os.urandom(4))[0], 0]
# Increment counter and wrap at 2^32
_NONCE[1] += 1
if _NONCE[1] > 0xffffffff:
_NONCE[1] = 0
# Return base + counter
return long((_NONCE[0] * 0xffffffff)) + _NONCE[1]
class SecureMessage(object):
"""A Secure Message object.
This class creates a signing/encryption facility for RPC messages.
It encapsulates all the necessary crypto primitives to insulate
regular code from the intricacies of message authentication, validation
and optionally encryption.
:param topic: The topic name of the queue
:param host: The server name, together with the topic it forms a unique
name that is used to source signing keys, and verify
incoming messages.
:param conf: a ConfigOpts object
:param key: (optional) explicitly pass in endpoint private key.
If not provided it will be sourced from the service config
:param key_store: (optional) Storage class for local caching
:param encrypt: (defaults to False) Whether to encrypt messages
:param enctype: (defaults to AES) Cipher to use
:param hashtype: (defaults to SHA256) Hash function to use for signatures
"""
def __init__(self, topic, host, conf, key=None, key_store=None,
encrypt=None, enctype='AES', hashtype='SHA256'):
conf.register_group(secure_message_group)
conf.register_opts(secure_message_opts, group='secure_messages')
self._name = '%s.%s' % (topic, host)
self._key = key
self._conf = conf.secure_messages
self._encrypt = self._conf.encrypt if (encrypt is None) else encrypt
self._crypto = cryptoutils.SymmetricCrypto(enctype, hashtype)
self._hkdf = cryptoutils.HKDF(hashtype)
self._kds = _KDSClient(self._conf.kds_endpoint)
if self._key is None:
self._key = self._init_key(topic, self._name)
if self._key is None:
err = "Secret Key (or key file) is missing or malformed"
raise SharedKeyNotFound(self._name, err)
self._key_store = key_store or _KEY_STORE
def _init_key(self, topic, name):
keys = None
if self._conf.secret_keys_file:
with open(self._conf.secret_keys_file, 'r') as f:
keys = f.readlines()
elif self._conf.secret_key:
keys = self._conf.secret_key
if keys is None:
return None
for k in keys:
if k[0] == '#':
continue
if ':' not in k:
break
svc, key = k.split(':', 1)
if svc == topic or svc == name:
return base64.b64decode(key)
return None
def _split_key(self, key, size):
sig_key = key[:size]
enc_key = key[size:]
return sig_key, enc_key
def _decode_esek(self, key, source, target, timestamp, esek):
"""This function decrypts the esek buffer passed in and returns a
KeyStore to be used to check and decrypt the received message.
:param key: The key to use to decrypt the ticket (esek)
:param source: The name of the source service
:param traget: The name of the target service
:param timestamp: The incoming message timestamp
:param esek: a base64 encoded encrypted block containing a JSON string
"""
rkey = None
try:
s = self._crypto.decrypt(key, esek)
j = jsonutils.loads(s)
rkey = base64.b64decode(j['key'])
expiration = j['timestamp'] + j['ttl']
if j['timestamp'] > timestamp or timestamp > expiration:
raise InvalidExpiredTicket(source, target)
except Exception:
raise InvalidEncryptedTicket(source, target)
info = '%s,%s,%s' % (source, target, str(j['timestamp']))
sek = self._hkdf.expand(rkey, info, len(key) * 2)
return self._split_key(sek, len(key))
def _get_ticket(self, target):
"""This function will check if we already have a SEK for the specified
target in the cache, or will go and try to fetch a new SEK from the key
server.
:param target: The name of the target service
"""
ticket = self._key_store.get_ticket(self._name, target)
if ticket is not None:
return ticket
tkt, expiration = self._kds.get_ticket(self._name, target,
self._crypto, self._key)
self._key_store.put_ticket(self._name, target,
base64.b64decode(tkt['skey']),
base64.b64decode(tkt['ekey']),
tkt['esek'], expiration)
return self._key_store.get_ticket(self._name, target)
def encode(self, version, target, json_msg):
"""This is the main encoding function.
It takes a target and a message and returns a tuple consisting of a
JSON serialized metadata object, a JSON serialized (and optionally
encrypted) message, and a signature.
:param version: the current envelope version
:param target: The name of the target service (usually with hostname)
:param json_msg: a serialized json message object
"""
ticket = self._get_ticket(target)
metadata = jsonutils.dumps({'source': self._name,
'destination': target,
'timestamp': time.time(),
'nonce': _get_nonce(),
'esek': ticket.esek,
'encryption': self._encrypt})
message = json_msg
if self._encrypt:
message = self._crypto.encrypt(ticket.ekey, message)
signature = self._crypto.sign(ticket.skey,
version + metadata + message)
return (metadata, message, signature)
def decode(self, version, metadata, message, signature):
"""This is the main decoding function.
It takes a version, metadata, message and signature strings and
returns a tuple with a (decrypted) message and metadata or raises
an exception in case of error.
:param version: the current envelope version
:param metadata: a JSON serialized object with metadata for validation
:param message: a JSON serialized (base64 encoded encrypted) message
:param signature: a base64 encoded signature
"""
md = jsonutils.loads(metadata)
check_args = ('source', 'destination', 'timestamp',
'nonce', 'esek', 'encryption')
for arg in check_args:
if arg not in md:
raise InvalidMetadata('Missing metadata "%s"' % arg)
if md['destination'] != self._name:
# TODO(simo) handle group keys by checking target
raise UnknownDestinationName(md['destination'])
try:
skey, ekey = self._decode_esek(self._key,
md['source'], md['destination'],
md['timestamp'], md['esek'])
except InvalidExpiredTicket:
raise
except Exception:
raise InvalidMetadata('Failed to decode ESEK for %s/%s' % (
md['source'], md['destination']))
sig = self._crypto.sign(skey, version + metadata + message)
if sig != signature:
raise InvalidSignature(md['source'], md['destination'])
if md['encryption'] is True:
msg = self._crypto.decrypt(ekey, message)
else:
msg = message
return (md, msg)